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REGAINING FINANCIAL STABILITY:
TAMING FINANCIAL MARKETS IS A 
MUST





The need for a radical overhaul of the regulation and supervision of financial markets 
has been acknowledged in all advanced economies. And yet, there still is a line of 
reasoning which argues that the main source of the current financial crisis is the 
cheap money of the past, which would have caused large global imbalances as well. 
But another, that I share, is that something wrong has been occurring with overall 
financial intermediation in recent decades. This is like saying that structure has been 
no less important in derailing economies than misconceived policies and unavoidable 
cyclical dynamics. By structure we mean  the configuration of rules and practices in 
the realm of regulation and supervision, on one hand; and the evolution and practices 
of financial institutions, including securitization and the growth of the so-called shadow 
banking sector (which has escaped regulations), on the other hand. Structure has, 
arguably, influenced policies in view of the relative neglect of systemic risks and the 
almost blind belief, by some, in the self-regulatory virtues and clairvoyance of financial 
markets. For a long time financial stability was relegated, de facto, to a second tier 
policy priority – especially in advanced economies. The current crisis has brought this 
concern back, with vengeance, and relates it to structure. The “great moderation” 
reveals itself as a “great misperception” period, which compels a rethinking of 
regulations and practices, of monetary policy itself (of inflation targeting, too), of the 
linkages between various domains of economic policy. Nothing seems to be certain 
any longer, in an increasingly stochastic world. Just think about the huge difference 
between how Spain and Ireland were judged before and after the eruption of this crisis 
– with a sharp deterioration of public finances and drastic economic downturn. 
The economies of EU new member states (NMSs) in Central and Eastern Europe 
have been most hardly hit by this financial crisis, a fact that has intrigued observers. 
Because these economies’ exposure to toxic products was quite minimal and their 
budget behaviors, with some exceptions, were not profligate. And yet, apart from 
                                                          
1 Paper based on a presentation made at a symposium organized by the National Bank of 
Romania, Bucharest, 4th September, 2010. 
2 NMSs refers to EU new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
* National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA), Bucharest, former finance 
minister of Romania and former MEP.
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Poland, their economic downturn was, on average, the most significant among 
emerging economies. What this paper argues is that this dynamics can be explained 
by considering implications of deep financial integration. The latter can bring benefits 
and rapid growth, which did take place in the Region until 2008, but it can also harm 
unless proper institutions and policies operate. Moreover, the impact of the current 
crisis on NMSs illustrates the role of Structure, of the rules of the game in the EU 
(complete capital account liberalization), the nature of regulation and supervision, and, 
not least, massive cross border operations. The case of NMSs is all the more 
significant since these economies imported capital on a big scale as a means to foster 
growth – while in Asia and Latin America, the episodes of crisis of the past two 
decades induced countries to attach a high premium on the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves and the reduction of current account deficits. NMSs look like they 
have tried to defy the lessons of previous crises by betting on the virtues of deep 
financial integration. This paper looks at their case and probes into future possible 
developments. This discussion is couched in a broader context, of the need to reform 
structure (rules and arrangements),  in the EU, too. A key argument is made: in order 
to regain financial stability, at the international level, a return to the initial logic of the 
Bretton Woods arrangements is needed. The financial policy trilemma (the impossible 
trinity)
3 would ask for releasing monetary policy and trade flows from the vicissitudes 
posed by unconstrained financial flows. The currency war underway and rising 
protectionism are additional indications that new international arrangements are badly 
needed if an open global system is to be preserved.  Finally, the paper puts forward a 
range of issues which need further scrutiny in order to make policy more effective
1. Financial Stability: rediscovering Structure
  The Great Depression prompted a radical reform of the regulation and supervision of 
financial markets, especially in the US. The Glass Steagall Act, which split investment 
from retail banking epitomizes that reform. Since then the western world has not 
witnessed a crisis of the magnitude and implications that the current one has entailed. 
Arguably, this situation explains why financial stability has staged a formidable 
comeback on the policy-making agenda in advanced economies. Episodes of financial 
crises did occur in emerging economies during the past century recurrently. But they 
were thought about as a specific phenomenon of poorly developed financial systems 
and fragile institutions. In addition, a paradigm extolling the virtues of deregulation of 
financial markets dominated increasingly policy-making in advanced economies (in 
the US and the EU) and influenced, considerably, the policy recommendations made 
by the IFIs to emerging economies. Once the crisis engulfed almost the whole 
industrialized world
4 a watershed chain of events has taken place. A cosmology that 
extolled the virtues of financial markets and neglected systemic risks is fading away. 
                                                          
3 Conceptualised on the basis of the Mundell-Fleming model. 
4 Financial crises did happen in western economies in recent decades: in Scandinavian 
economies in the early ‘90s, in the US (the Savings&Loan Associations crisis in the ‘80s), etc. 
Canada has been less hit by the current crisis owing to its much better regulated and 
supervised banking system. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Eugene Fama (and his “efficient markets hypothesis”) has given way to Hyman 
Minsky’s  insights into how financial markets function. This crisis gripped the markets 
of the western world, where deep financial integration was seen as a complete 
blessing. Late in 2008 European leaders continued to be mired in the illusion of a 
relative robustness of EU economies. They thought that the subprime crisis across the 
Ocean would stay there; they seemed not to realize the extent of EU headquartered 
big banks’ involvement in the origination and distribution of fancy financial products, 
the interconnectedness of the financial markets, the presence of a shadow banking 
sector in Europe as well. As a matter of fact, many people in central banks and 
finance ministries seemed not to realize the implications of the new structure of the 
financial intermediation system, of the shadow banking sector – with their immense 
risks.  
The current crisis shows that something is structurally wrong with financial markets. 
For a long time not a few economists and policy makers decried the fact that policies 
are geared toward complying with markets’ excessive pressure, with the power of a 
structure – which, seemingly, is beyond any control. What Perroux, though in a 
different context, called l’emprise de la structure (the power of structure) was a cause 
of major concern before this crisis. Imagine what the thinking is now in this regard. 
Structure is key in understanding the current crisis. For, on one hand, it can derail 
even brilliantly conceived policies; on the other hand, for it can shape policies wrongly. 
For instance, complacency vis-à-vis the overexpansion of financial entities 
overexposes economy to major risks (like it happened to Iceland, Ireland, etc.). Or 
consider a premature opening of the capital account, as it happened in numerous 
Asian economies during the past decade, not least under the prodding of the IFIs, and 
the policy approach what propounded the deregulations of financial markets as a 
means to foster economic growth. 
The paradigm shift which is, currently, underway  is rediscovering systemic risks: the 
complexity and inter-connectedness of financial markets, contagion effects, “Minsky 
moments”. But there is need to make here a distinction between two opposed 
cognitive approaches: one that believes that nothing can be done about the evolution 
of markets, whatever way financial innovation goes; and another approach, which 
does not take the complexion of markets as God given and has misgivings about a 
range of financial innovations. Networks do not mushroom accidentally only; they are 
also shaped by policies. As Haldane, the director of research from the Bank of 
England, aptly remarked: “Deregulation swept aside banking segregation and, with it, 
decomposability of the financial network. The upshot was a predictable lack of 
network robustness. That is one reason why Glass Steagall is now back on the 
international policy agenda”(p.31). The inference is that waves of deregulation of 
financial markets (see also Johnson and Kwak)
5 have amplified systemic risks and 
have endangered the functioning of economies. 
Financial intermediation, as it has evolved during the past decades proves, 
peremptorily, that not all financial innovation is good, that inadequate risk and 
business models have been used by banks and other financial institutions. Quite a 
                                                          
5 The repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (2000), etc. 
have favoured high leverage, speculation, excessive risk taking, etc. Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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while ago clear warnings were sent regarding the growing opaqueness of markets due 
to securitization and off-balance sheet activity. Lamfalussy observed that financial 
integration made “crisis prevention and handling it more difficult” (p.73).  Moreover, 
the financial industry has become oversized in not a few economies. Just think of the 
damage caused to Ireland, Iceland, the UK,  by bank overexpansion and over-risky 
operations. As a matter fact, the Icelandic and Irish economies were brought on their 
knees by the reckless expansion of some of their banks. Some make reference to 
Diamond and Mirlees(1971) and judge financial transactions as "intermediate 
production", which, presumably, makes economy function better. Therefore, the 
argument would be that no interference should take place with this intermediation. 
And that, consequently, it should not be taxed in order to avoid resource misallocation. 
But this view is more than questionable when financial intermediation develops its 
raison d'etre. This has occurred in the last couple of decades, with much of 
transactions undertaken for their own sake – because of inadequate incentives and 
other reasons. Financial entities created their own demand by enticing clients with 
various types of securities. They did it because of big fees. Clients accepted this game 
because they thought they could invest safely; others because they thought they can 
borrow very cheaply. Add to it the mountain of CDSs and CDOs, which have caused, 
directly and indirectly, an immense systemic risk.
6 Contrary to what Diamond and 
Mirlees say, this financial intermediation led to a large scale misallocation of resources 
and over-indebtedness
7. Thence resulted the budget crisis in Europe and the US and 
intense deleveraging by banks. And the distortions will persist if nothing is done about 
it.  Arguably, Diamond and Mirlees might have judged differently a state of affairs as 
the one we experienced, increasingly, in the financial system until the crisis 
irrupted. For a lot of fixed income transactions is pure speculation, which reinforces 
the idea that much of financial intermediation is undertaken for pure financial gains. 
Some say that a transaction tax would be deleterious overall, since it would increase 
volatility and transaction costs, but this is a one-sided argument. A liquidity crisis, as 
the current crisis has amply shown, is more likely when there is a rise in systemic 
risks. And an increasing volume of "fancy" financial transactions, instead of enhancing 
liquidity in markets, can bring about their standstill. What matters essentially is the 
nature of financial transactions, whether they create value, or are simply either a rent-
seeking exercise on the part of the financial industry, or pure gambling. This is why a 
transaction tax, as a means of reducing volatility in currency markets, does make 
sense. And technology can help implement it. 
Banking (financial intermediation, in general) performs an essential  public utility 
function; it can do much good, but it can also do much harm unless it is properly 
regulated. This is why it is essential to understand the functioning of its structure and 
regulate and supervise it adequately. Nowhere is more glaring the significance of 
structure than in the European Union, in the EMU in particular. Because, in this area 
massive cross border operations take place while national prerogatives in regulation 
                                                          
6 Not incidentally Warren Buffett called them financial weapons of mass destruction. And 
George Soros suggested that some of them be prohibited. 
7 As the head of the FDIC in the US Sheila Bair put it: “the bust was clear evidence that capital 
was misallocated and could have been put to more productive use”, Financial Times, 24 
August, 2010.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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and supervision, in tax policies stay, basically, in national hands. Moreover, as some 
stressed from its very inception, the EMU is not an optimal currency area
8.The current 
crisis gas has revealed the inadequacy of existing arrangements. The latter have 
favored the accumulation of internal imbalances against the background of one-sided 
policy tools. The “one size fits all” monetary policy of the ECB could not prevent 
excessive capital, frequently of a speculative nature, flowing into less developed areas 
of the EMU, in the EU as a whole; a misallocation of resources was stimulated in this 
way. Likewise, an increasing entanglement of mutual exposure among financial 
entities has happened while burden-sharing (fiscal) arrangements were missing. 
Unless major changes take place in EU economic governance, in the regulation and 
supervision of financial markets, the very functioning of the Union is put at risk. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that this crisis is also one of deep financial integration. 
Thence the need for deep reforms, for appropriate policy and institutional 
underpinnings. The situation of NMSs is to bee seen in this context; the accession 
treaties ask them to comply with the rules of a Union (structure), which entail benefits 
but, also, pose risks. As mentioned above, misallocation of resources took place in 
several NMSs
9 following a premature opening of the capital account. And inadequate 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements operate in their case, too, in view of the size 
of cross-border financial flows and the domination of local markets by foreign banks. 
Outside Europe, and learning from previous crises, emerging economies tried to 
forestall shocks by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves as a buffer (a high 
premium was put on them). This trend was reinforced by “industrial policies’’ aims; 
                                                          
8 The optimum currency area (OCA) theory shows that the adoption of a single currency pays 
off when the monetary area is highly integrated economically and has the capacity to adjust 
quickly to asymmetrical shocks. Traditionally there are five core OCA properties namely: wage 
and price flexibility, trade integration, cyclical convergence, factor mobility, and fiscal 
federalism, which are used to assess a success of an OCA area. On these accounts, the euro 
area still seems to have way to go in order to achieve an efficient functioning. In the EU wage 
setting continues to be done, predominantly, at the national level, and quite often at the 
sectorial level. This mechanism reinforces the relative inflexibility of the individual countries’ 
labour markets. Within the euro-area real wages have tended to be downwardly rigid with a 
relatively high level of indexation. Moreover, although nominal interest rates have largely 
converged, there is a wide discrepancy among real interest rates of the Eurozone members. 
Although business cycles synchronization appear to have increased within the Eurozone 
countries, much of it has to do with the recent fall in the amplitude of global business 
fluctuations, which benefited from low interest rates, high economic growth and low inflation. 
However, considerable structural differences remain at the Eurozone country member level. 
European labour mobility remains fairly limited, despite persistent differences in regional 
unemployment. Given the existence of an independent EU monetary authority, the ECB, the 
argument for an EU Fiscal Authority appears to be compelling. This would create more room 
for manoeuvre for the fiscal mechanisms of purchasing power transfers in the face of 
idiosyncratic shocks. It would also place less pressure on the ECB when dealing with regional 
divergences. The EU budget is little more than 1% of the EU GDP, providing limited scope for 
stabilising cross-state transfers. Moreover, a large part of that budget is allocated towards 
spending on the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds, which are weakly related 
to cyclical fluctuations in the individual member states. 
9 A Bruegel publication highlights this type of capital flow into the Baltic economies, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria (Becker et al., especially chapter 2, 2010). Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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uphill financial flows were seen as a cost for the build up of a wherewithal capacity in 
the advent of anticipated external shocks. In Europe, integration, with its financial 
component, was seen as a principal way to achieve catching up. And partially, this 
philosophy brought about expected benefits. But it has also entailed weaknesses, 
which are not to be linked, exclusively, with weak policies. The power of structure 
(including the free flow of capital) has an explanatory role in what has happened. 
The reform of regulations and supervision has to target the whole structure. In my 
opinion, banking should get back to its roots.  The Volcker’s rules, what Lord Turner 
and Vince Cable advocate in the UK, and some EU reforms are pushing in the right 
direction; arguably, more is needed – not least for preventing regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulations need to be comprehensive, which means that the shadow banking sector 
(including the hedge funds, private equity funds, all kind of derivatives) be covered 
with no exception. Regaining financial stability, therefore, implies reforming structure
and repairing policies. Monetary policy would have to be redefined; price stability plus 
financial stability, as objectives of central banks,  would, quite likely, make simple 
rules a thing of the past. Economic policy, in general, would be harder to define and 
implement in a more uncertain world. For, as Pisani Ferry remarked, deterministic 
governance does not work in a stochastic world (2010, p.2). A consequence is that 
policy-makers have to develop policy space in better times, which implies, among 
others, that they need to conduct anti-cyclical policies. 
2. A focus on NMSs: the role of Structure
Integration in the EU has been a strategic aim of most post-communist countries. In 
simplistic terms, it meant the ticket to economic prosperity and being part of an 
exclusive club, which would operate as a shelter as well. In many respects integration 
has speeded up institutional and economic progress, not least by forcing EU 
candidates to undertake major reforms and comply with EU rules of the game. But this 
crisis indicates also less rosy parts of deep financial integration – some of them linked 
with the total opening of the capital account and contamination effects.
Financial integration has been a major channel for the transmission of shocks. In 
some countries the credit crunch has been very severe, liquidity shortages were acute 
at the height of the crisis and even the spectre of solvency problems emerged, 
especially where external imbalances had grown quite rapidly in the past decade. The 
NMSs region experienced a much sharper capital flows reversal than Latin America or 
Asia during 2008-2009: capital inflows decreased by about 10 percent of GDP on 
average between 2007 and 2009. The fact that most of these countries are small and 
open, and hence typically have less domestic resources to avert crises and could be 
more sensitive to changes in investors’ sentiment, cannot be the main reason, as 
there are many small countries all around the world where the crisis had less of an 
impact.
A more plausible reason for the special worries about NMSs lies in the deep financial 
integration that these countries have achieved and in the related reliance on net 
capital inflows. Financial integration and, in the case of EU members, the logic of the 
single market, predisposed NMSs and EU candidate countries to external imbalances. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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The reliance on net external funding created a systemic risk in non-Eurozone member 
countries because of potentially devastating chains of corporate defaults and the 
related currency risk for the economy as a whole. But no meltdown of financial 
systems has taken place; this is a fact that deserves scrutiny. However, there are 
worries about future economic growth. 
2.1 Deep financial integration and NMSs 
Huge externalities were produced by the financial crisis in terms of magnitude and the 
geographic area they cover. These externalities, which are rooted in big countries’ 
policies, are not something new. One could make an analogy with the Fed’s policy 
turnaround decades ago, when  double digit inflation was brought down by a very 
severe tightening of US monetary policy. That move threw in disarray countries which 
had borrowed heavily externally by having been encouraged to do so by negative real 
interest rates (which followed the recycling of petrodollars). But the current crisis is 
much more profound, and its roots are  embedded in the pattern of financial markets 
that have evolved in advanced economies during the past two decades.
EU specifics matter a lot in the way the financial crisis hit NMSs. Thus, there is a 
single market while national prerogatives remain important. Whereas monetary policy 
is unique in the Euro Area, the regulation and supervision of financial markets stay in 
national hands. Massive cross-border operations bring to the fore the issue of crisis 
management, burden sharing and resolution schemes. A convergence in the 
regulation and supervision does make sense (hence the need for common rulebooks), 
but this is not enough for an orderly functioning of the single market. In addition, the 
very functioning of the single financial market has to come to grips with its 
imperfections – which implies that macroeconomic policies have to be adjusted 
accordingly.
NMSs’ varied circumstances matter too: size, in or outside the Euro Area, domination 
of local financial markets by foreign groups (Figure 1); high euroization (except the 
Czech Republic). From the euphoria of accession (for NMSs) and pretty high 
economic growth rates there is now gloom because of deep recession and much 
worsened prospects for future economic growth. While Poland has not fallen into 
recession, that is an exception, its budget deficit, too, rose sharply. The massive 
presence of foreign banks on local financial markets has brought benefits, but it 
shows its less favorable side too; the credit crunch has added to the pains of an 
excessive reliance on capital imports. During the crisis, parent banks in the EU-15 had 
to face serious liquidity and capital pressures and at the time of acute market 
turbulences it was not at all clear how these parent banks would manage their 
subsidiaries and branches in NMSs
10; this contributed to uncertainties regarding 
foreign subsidiaries.
11
                                                          
10 In the heat of the crisis the subsidiaries had difficulties accessing to liquidity and the first bank 
rescue attempts by EU-15 governments were especially targeted at the home-country 
operations of the banking groups, thereby weakening the subsidiaries further. 
11 Later, however, the ECOFIN issued a declaration that packages must support subsidiaries as 
well. Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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Figure 1 
Foreign bank ownership, 1998-2005 
(Assets owned by foreign banks as a per cent of banking system assets) 
Source: Chart 6b from Berglöf et al. (2009). 
Until the crisis hit a rapid expansion of credit (fuelled by foreign lenders) took place in 
most NMSs. In the currency board using countries, in Hungary, Romania, etc., rates of 
over 30-40% yearly were the norm while much of this credit was foreign currency 
denominated and taken by the private sector . Though public debts are low in most 
NMSs private debts had been growing quite rapidly in the years preceding this crisis 
and a large portion of them was short term. A credit crunch was unavoidable
12. Like in 
Asia a decade ago the private debt and the sudden stop of funding created a systemic 
risk in non-Eurozone member countries because of potentially devastating chains of 
corporate defaults and the related currency risk for the economy as a whole. 
Therefore, government intervention  became inevitable and, in several cases, external 
official assistance was asked for. Figure 2 shows the level of credit (measured in 
domestic currency unit) normalized as September 2008 = 100 (i.e. it starts from the 
date of the collapse of Lehman Brothers); 
13 net lending collapsed and quickly turned 
to negative soon after September 2008.
                                                          
12 Ghosh (2009) studied this question for Hungary, Latvia and Poland for the 2008Q3-2009Q2 
period. He finds evidence of a credit crunch in all these countries, though at different times: the 
crunch affected Poland in 2008Q4 only, Latvia in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, and Hungary from 
2008Q4 to 2009Q2. Ghosh concludes that ‘the initial credit crunch and credit supply problems is 
likely to have contributed to the decline in GDP and hence to the decline in credit demand 
subsequently’ (p. 43). This suggests that the credit crunch was an important factor of recession 
during the current crisis. Other NMSs have quite likely faced similar developments. 
13 The fast increase of the market value of credit outstanding to the private sector immediately 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in some countries is largely due to valuation effects as Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 2 
Credit to the private sector (measured in domestic currency unit, 
September 2008 = 100),
January 2008 to February 2010 







































































































































































Note. The scale of the two panels is different.  
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; Becker et al. (p.93). 
The current financial crisis underlines pitfalls of seeing financial integration as the 
main driver of real convergence. Financial markets are more volatile than others and 
are more likely to bring about a boom-bust dynamic. One can establish here an 
analogy between what happened in several NMSs and in Ireland and Spain, which are 
members of the EMU. Financial integration and the logic of the single market (in the 
EU) has predisposed NMSs to growing external imbalances – due primarily to their 
inferior economic development and, thence, perceived substantial positive yield 
differentials of investment opportunities. In the Baltic countries, in Bulgaria and 
Romania,  much of this investment was of a speculative nature, or, was focused on 
non-tradeables
14. The rising indebtedness of households and firms,  increasingly on 
short-term and foreign currency-denominated, should be seen in conjunction with 
weakened monetary policy and budget policy ineffectiveness as a means of restricting 
growing imbalances, and the opening of the capital account. 
The reliance on massive capital imports is illustrated in Figure 3, which presents data 
on the 2008 public and private debts in the NMSs and several other EU and non-EU 
countries. Except Hungary, public debt in NMSs was not high by international 
standards. Total private debt was comparatively low in Poland, the Czech Republic 
                                                                                                                               
the domestic currency value of foreign currency loans rose sharply as exchange rates 
depreciated. 
14 See especially chapters 1 and 2 in “Whither economic growth in central and eastern 
Europe?”(Becker et al.). Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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and Slovakia, but high – taking into account relative development levels – in Latvia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Estonia.
Figure 3 
Gross private and public debt











































































































































       Gross Private Debt: Other Monetary Fin. Corp.
       Gross Private Debt: Non-Financial Corp.
       Gross Private Debt: Households and NPISH
Source: Eurostat, IMF and Becket et al. (p.80). 
This relatively high level of indebtedness proved to be a weakness in the crisis, 
especially when loans had been denominated in foreign currency. Figure 4 presents 
indicators of gross and net external liabilities for 2008. Differences within the region 
are evident: Central European countries had reasonably low liabilities, again with the 
exception of Hungary, while the Baltics and Croatia were heavily indebted externally, 
especially when compared to Asia and Latin America. So by common standards they 
could be considered vulnerable ex ante.  Only three Central European countries – the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia – avoided falling victim to rapidly rising 
domestic debt and only four (the same three plus Slovenia) avoided the external debt 
trap. All other countries experienced foreign-financed credit booms and the resulting 
accumulation of private (or, in the case of Hungary, private and public) debt. In these 
countries neither monetary and fiscal policies nor financial regulation were able to 
avoid the build-up of imbalances in a financially integrated environment. 
Contagion, i.e. intra-regional spillovers, was also among the major features regarding 
NMSs during this crisis. As past financial crises show a crisis can spread through 
contagion even to less vulnerable economies.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 4 




































































































































      Net External Loan and 
Debt Liabilities
Column 1:
       Gross External Debt: Banks
       Gross External Debt: Monetary Authorities
       Gross External Debt: General Government
       Gross External Debt: Direct Investment: Intercompany Lending





Note: Ireland’s total gross external debt is 915% of GDP, but for better readability of the figure, 
the vertical axis has a 300 cut-off. Apart from Croatia, data for Western Balkan countries are 
generally not available. 
Source: Eurostat, IMF, and Becker et al. (p.82). 
2.2. STRUCTURE and a magnified monetary policy dilemma 
Rapid growth of credit created bubbles in several NMSs and accentuated a monetary 
policy dilemma. This policy concern is not unusual in emerging economies, where 
there is relative capital scarcity, which would create good investment opportunities. 
Provided these countries enjoy political, social and economic stability capital inflows 
would be commonsensical. Essentially, this dilemma refers to the inability of monetary 
policy to prevent a rise in the current account to possibly  unsustainable levels 
irrespective of the stance of monetary policy; it was highlighted regarding the NMSs 
owing to their clustering in the vicinity of older member of the EU and their presumed 
increasing institutional and economic stability following market based reforms – which 
would have fuelled capital inflows. Even before joining the EU this policy dilemma was 
pretty obvious and debated
15 since these economies were considered to have very 
good prospects for durable high economic growth rates under the safety umbrella of 
the Union. This dilemma is organically linked with the functioning of liberalizing 
financial markets – when governments no longer have the capacity to restrict, 
potentially, overwhelming capital inflows. High interest rates would attract capital flows 
(short-term,  in particular) which would appreciate the local currency ever more (for 
pegged currencies this would occur via real appreciation entailed by inflation 
                                                          
15 Lipschitz, Lane and Mourmouras. Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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differentials), which enlarge the current account deficit; the latter would also increase 
when low interest rates (aimed at discouraging capital inflows) would fuel domestic 
demand too much. Thence the acrobatics the policy makers in NMSs had to 
undertake. One should underline, in this regard, specific circumstances of NMS before 
and after accession: lower endowment of capital as against labor (capital/labor ratios 
are lower than in the rest of the EU), financial markets which are much thinner than in 
EU advanced economies and a gradual, but steady, process of capital account 
liberalization (which was a must for joining the EU). The latter process has led to 
intense euroization in most of these economies (except the Czech Republic), which 
has further crippled the potency of domestic monetary policy. It should be said that 
euroization was also stimulated by the commitment to adopt the euro after accession.
The capital account liberalization has undermined the monetary policy attempts at 
cooling down overheating economies. When central banks tried to tighten policy local 
banks lent in foreign currency at apparently much more convenient rates than for local 
currencies; the seemingly much more attractive borrowing in foreign currency was 
reinforced by declining interest rates on world credit markets during the decade of the 
Great Moderation and the real appreciation of local currencies. Central banks were left 
with the option of raising reserve requirements as a very crude way of tightening liquidity.
Until the irruption of the financial crisis a substantial real appreciation did occur in all 
NMSs, which is not surprising in view of the heavy capital inflows which they received 
during this decade. In both currency board and managed floating arrangements 
domestic currencies went up substantially until 2008 
16. But fundamentals of this 
appreciation were precarious, particularly where current account deficits went into the 
double digit territory and their funding included much speculative capital. Analysts 
cautioned European transition economies as to the pitfalls of heavy capital inflows and 
underlined the virtues of prudent fiscal policies when monetary policy is deprived of 
efficacy. Nonetheless, like in the Asian experience of the last decade, the largest part 
of the current account deficits was caused, in not a few NMSs, by substantial private 
sector borrowing. Actually, the logic of the single market, with its ensuing liberalization 
of the capital account, is arguably, responsible for their rising current account 
deficits
17. It should also be noted that most of the credit drive in the NMSs was the 
result, primarily, of foreign banks' expansion policies. This is why Baltic  economies, 
Romania and Bulgaria, etc. should not be totally blamed for “home-made” 
vulnerabilities. Moreover,  this expansion is the product of EU rules of the game. That 
fiscal policies in these economies were too pro-cyclical, in some countries (including 
Romania) at a time of high economic growth is a different matter for discussion. 
The credit crunch, the loss of appetite for assuming risks and, especially, the capital 
flight seem to have modified the context drastically. Will policy makers revisit this 
monetary policy dilemma in the not too distant future? Several remarks deserve to be 
made in this respect: 
x  pressure toward depreciation is undermining financial stability where euroization 
is pretty high; 
                                                          
16 See also Brender and Pisani . 
17 This is blatantly indicated by Bulgaria’s experience; for years this country registered budget 
surpluses while its current account deficits went above 15% in recent years. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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x  the financial stability concern is strengthened by foreign currency lending 
practiced by local banks; 
x  currency boards arrangements are under pressure in the Baltic economies, where 
devaluation has been avoided through very painful measures cuts of wages and 
pension in nominal terms); 
x  the financial crisis will have lingering effects, which would reduce the appetite for 
risk taking; 
x  big economies exert a crowding-out effect on global credit markets, that would 
keep the cost of credit high in the years to come (in spite of massive liquidity 
injections by central banks); 
x  local banks will be more cautious in their lending. 
2.3 Cross-border bank ownership and financial stability 
The substantial exposure to NMSs of banking groups headquartered in older 
members of the EU has become a source of both home- and host-country concern. 
One reason is related to potential losses resulting from sharp economic downturns.
18
Another concern, from the host country perspective, is the fear of a possible disorderly 
disinvestment of these banking groups from NMSs countries. The increased exposure 
of a bank to a particular geographic area also raises micro-prudential regulation and 
supervision issues.
The distribution of responsibilities between home and host country and the inexistence 
of detailed burden-sharing arrangements in the event of a crisis is a major handicap 
for the single market under conditions of deep financial integration.
19 Under current 
arrangements, responsibility for the stability of financial institutions belongs to the 
supervisor of the country where they are headquartered whereas responsibility for the 
stability of financial systems belongs to the supervisor of the host country. So for a 
country whose financial system is dominated by foreign banks institutional supervision 
belongs to various foreign supervisors whereas the local supervisor has responsibility 
for the local financial system. To correct this far from ideal allocation of 
responsibilities, ex ante cooperation among supervisors takes place in committees 
and memoranda of understanding have been agreed upon to guide action in crisis 
situation, but incentives to share information are weak and provisions for cooperation 
in crisis management are little more than declarations of good intention. As to crisis 
resolution, there are no ex ante burden-sharing arrangements and the management of 
the near-bankruptcies of Fortis and Dexia in 2008 illustrated how much solutions are 
dependent on the ability of governments to quickly agree on ad hoc arrangements
20.
                                                          
18 This especially applies to countries like Austria, Belgium and Sweden whose banking sector 
exposure to the NMSs region is significant macroeconomically. 
19 As the de Larosiere report (2009) says, ‘The absence of a sound framework for crisis 
management and resolution (with sufficiently clear principles on burden sharing, customers’ 
protection, assets transferability and winding up) complicates the introduction of an effective and 
efficient supervisory system to avoid financial crises in the first place’ (p. 76). 
20 Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010) provide an informative account of the management of the 
banking crisis in the EU.  Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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This crisis brings ammunition to the idea that a common rulebook, more integrated 
supervision, and a common framework for crisis resolution are all needed to match the 
degree of market integration in financial services.  On the other hand, the burden-
sharing issue prompts national governments and supervisors to think more along 
national lines, in view of their accountability toward national tax-payers. How this 
contradiction will be addressed and whether or not it will be resolved is crucial for the 
future of European integration.
Before this crisis, the lead supervisor concept (which was promoted by leading 
financial groups) was resisted by small countries on both political and financial stability 
grounds. These countries feared that a loss of final say in the deliberations of the 
supervisory colleges, because of their host-country status, would cripple their capacity 
to intervene during a crisis. Because foreign groups, that operate multi-jurisdictionally, 
could be tempted to reallocate capital in a way that might create havoc locally, what 
would seem optimal for a financial group might be quite suboptimal for a host country. 
If problems emerge there may be a divergence of interest with ‘the home supervisor 
wishing to see maximum transferability of liquidity to offset the emergence of group 
wide liquidity problems, while host supervisors wish to ring fence liquidity at national 
level precisely because they have growing concerns about the whole group position’ 
(The Turner Review, 2009, p. 99). And, as the Turner Review stresses, even well 
capitalized local bank subsidiaries are likely to face liquidity crises if the whole group 
is seen to be in trouble. And in view of the powerful contagion effects which are likely 
to operate in the event of a crisis the trouble would extend to whole banking systems.
The De Larosière group report, followed by the decisions by the Ecofin meeting of 9th 
June (2009) to strengthen micro-prudential supervision via turning the Lamfalussy 
Level  3 Committees into ‘European Authorities’ and the creation of the ESRB 
(European Systemic Risk Board) in charge of macroprudential supervision are 
important steps which have given an impetus to the creation of a European system of 
regulation and supervision.
2.4  Why no meltdown occurred 
There are four main explanations behind the avoidance of a financial meltdown in the 
NMSs. Thus, prior to the crisis, the region's financial sectors were relatively sound, in 
comparison to, e.g., the Asian countries in the 1990s (see EBRD, 2009). Multilateral 
responses were undertaken. Medium-term financial assistance conditional on fiscal 
consolidation and on the implementation of comprehensive economic reform 
programmes has played a crucial role.
21 Other multilateral support includes the 
frontloading of disbursement from EU structural and cohesion funds as well as the 
expansion of European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development activities. Next, a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Co-ordination Initiative aiming at ensuring a rollover of the Western European bank’s 
                                                          
21 Programmes were led by the IMF, but for three EU countries (Hungary, Latvia and Romania) 
with EU participation both financially and substantively (as well as World Bank and EBRD 
assistance, and, for Latvia, bilateral assistance by seven European countries). Institute of Economic Forecasting
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 2/2011 156
claims on the region ('The Vienna Initiative')
22, the ECB’s support for parent banks, 
and the EU’s political commitment that bank rescue packages would have to support 
subsidiaries, have all played important roles. And, not least, the swift rescue of parent 
banks by EU-15 governments has greatly contributed to stability. Without it, crisis 
management measures specifically targeted at the region would have not been 
effective. In the case of a failure of a parent bank that has an important market share 
in a NMS country, that country – even if it was a least vulnerable one – would have 
suffered much more.  
Stress tests for banks were conducted. Yet the overall assessment of the ECB at the 
end of 2009 was cautious: ‘Looking ahead, the macroeconomic outlook in the non-
Euro Area EU  countries has improved somewhat …, although there is still an 
unusually high degree of uncertainty. Rising unemployment, lower incomes and 
corporate defaults are likely to lead to a further increase in loan delinquencies and a 
further deterioration of bank loan portfolios.’ (ECB, 2009, p. 29.) The share of non-
performing loans (Figure 5) has indeed been rising in many countries, though 
end-2009 levels were still well below, even in the worst hit countries, the levels 
reached in several Asian countries in the late 1990s (30-40 per cent in some of these 
countries). Yet the share of non-performing loans is a lagging indicator. Also, as it 
does not include all rescheduled debt, it may not give a full picture of bad loans.
Figure 5 
Share of non-performing loans, 2000-2009 
                                                          
22 The ‘Vienna Initiative’ is a multilateral effort to secure financial sector stability in those CESEE 
countries with substantial foreign bank ownership. It stipulates coordination between all relevant 
stakeholders, including international banking groups, home- and host-country authorities, 
international financial institutions and the EU, with the aim of developing a common 
understanding on key issues. It aims to secure the commitments by both international banking 
groups and home- and host-country authorities, and to coordinate a fair burden sharing (see 
Box 1.4 in EBRD, 2009).Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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Note: Data refer to end of the year. 
Source: IMF GFSR October 2009, EBRD, Berglöf et al. (2009), and Becker et al. (p .87). 
3. Regaining Financial Stability 
Regaining financial stability must target both structure and policies. Structure refers to 
its configuration, in the EU and globally. The reform of the governance in the EU and 
the reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets are essential for 
improving the functioning of EU structure. In the EU national policies depend on EU 
institutional and policy arrangements. Likewise, national policies would have to 
consider the effects of the current crisis, the external environment and the rising 
sovereign debt problem.
3.1 EU arrangements and national policy options 
This paper puts emphasis on structure in understanding the roots of this crisis and 
the tension in the EU (EMU). Such a perspective reinforces the rationale for a  reform 
of EU economic  governance; since without it a breakdown of the EMU is to envisage, 
with effects on the existence of the EU itself. As the current crisis indicates it is not 
only fiscal rules and their compliance with that a proper functioning of the EMU hinges 
on. Growing imbalances stemming from the dynamics of private sector saving and 
investment flows have also played a major role in triggering the sovereign debt crisis 
in the EMU. In this context the overexpansion of financial institutions and their 
investment behaviour is to be highlighted. Therefore, a reform of governance has to 
address, apart from fiscal rules and compliance with them, issues such as imbalances 
in current accounts, wage dynamics and, not least, how to strengthen surveillance of 
member countries in the working out and reporting of economic data. How to foster 
real economic convergence is another major policy challenge since the EMU does not 
enjoy sufficient optimality as a currency area. It appears that the policy proposals 
which are put forward in Brussels (either by the special task force led by President 
Herman van Rompuy, or by the Economic Commission) address less the issue of 
dealing with insufficient real convergence and ensuing disequilibria which, sooner or Institute of Economic Forecasting
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later, strain the Union.  A threat for the EMU is a growing cleavage between its 
northern and its southern tiers, with the latter one being held in vicious circles, 
incapable of overcoming the impact of austerity measures (which are asked for by 
fiscal consolidation). In this context resolution schemes, including orderly restructuring 
of sovereign debts is to be highlighted.
23 But would these schemes help achieve 
convergence? I doubt it. Moreover, the involvement of the private sector in these 
schemes is quite tricky under the current circumstances, though it does make a lot of 
sense in order to restore the logic of properly functioning markets – which implies that 
those who rake risks bear both rewards and losses. For it would, quite likely, raise 
budget deficit funding premia for some EMU states, which are already under the threat 
of sovereign debt crisis. Not least, in the structure of EU governance reform, the 
reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets – with its European (EU) 
bodies – and the construction of burden-sharing arrangements are to be underlined. 
NMSs have a stake in EU governance reform since they cannot escape the impact of 
EU wide externalities, contagion effects. For even countries which were quite prudent 
budget policy-wise and limited their external disequilibria (ex: Czech Republic, Poland, 
etc.) were caught into the crisis maelstrom.  In addition, NMSs are bound to join the 
EMU according to accession treaties.  This crisis has taught them lessons regarding 
linkages between overall economic policy and financial stability. In this context a 
rethinking of monetary policy is in the cards, too.  For most NMSs in which the private 
sector has become highly indebted a process of deleveraging is underway . A crucial 
issue for these countries is how to avoid that deleveraging weigh too much on growth 
in the years to come. In a few Central European countries with reasonably low private 
sector indebtedness controlling the expansion of credit may come to the fore earlier 
than elsewhere. But in all countries, liquidity and perhaps solvency risks may show up 
again should market sentiment worsen again. Last but not least, crisis resolution 
remains an issue in countries with significant foreign bank ownership. 
Rethinking monetary policy 
How would this crisis change the practice of monetary policy (“inflation targeting”, 
where it is practiced) owing to the new focus on financial stability? One problem 
regards the control of monetary aggregates when credit expansion is very intense and 
financial innovation loosens the relationship between the monetary base, M0, and 
broad money, M2. Over the last three decades, the relationship between M0, over 
which a central bank has control, and M2, over which a central bank does not have 
control, has weakened considerably. This has made the task of implementing 
monetary policy by a central bank more difficult. In hindsight, the increase in M2 in a 
global low inflation environment was made possible with increased leverage by 
financial institutions – helped by the development of complex financial product and the 
creation of a parallel architecture to the banking system (the so-called shadow 
banking system). The size of the latter, which was basically non-regulated, has been 
constantly increasing over the last 10-15 years. This evolution brings to memory the 
Gurley-Shaw report of decades ago, which highlighted the imprecision in 
                                                          
23 What Jean Pisani-Ferry calls a  “statutory European Debt Resolution Mechanism” (2010). The 
task force under Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, does address 
this issue as well. Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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distinguishing between credit and money; and, consequently, major hurdles for 
effective monetary policy. Financial stability, by being added quite explicitly to the 
objective of price stability, will complicates the conduct of monetary policy.
Credit resumption 
Government policies can impact on credit creation in several ways:
x  Credible macroeconomic policies (including the consolidation of public finances 
and the reduction in the level and volatility of inflation, where these are needed) so 
that markets do not ask for excessive risk premia in lending to local businesses. 
x  Macroeconomic adjustment in countries with overvalued exchange rate and high 
private debt. Both internal adjustment and currency devaluation would increase 
the debt/income ratio further, but in the actually adopted first scenario the 
adjustment is slower, economic recovery is also slower, and banks do not need to 
rely on government support. An adjustment in macroeconomic policy that may 
include devaluation would lead to immediate heavy losses to the banking sector 
and government intervention would be needed. This would ask for debt resolution 
schemes, and the government may assume part of the bad loans (i.e. provide 
subsidy to banks and/or the non-financial private sector). But, any subsidy will 
likely raise serious moral hazard and distributional issues and NMSs governments 
have very limited resources for such an undertaking.
x  Fostering credit through public banks or through domestic development banks. 
Governments or central banks may promote lending this way. The use of this 
channel would find a boundary in the scarce resources NMS governments can 
muster to this end.
x  Creating a public institution (‘bad bank’) to deal with dubious credits and fostering 
banks to sell their dubious credits to this institution. But cleaning up banks would 
not automatically raise banks’ propensity to lend, and there are questions marks 
about whether such an institution could be set up at a host country level.
The EU can support these actions by a high use of EU structural and cohesion funds 
to bolster economic growth and enhance the crowding in of commercial lending.
Access to liquidity and solvency problems 
There are several means to enhance access to liquidity and mitigate solvency threats 
at a supra-national level, and indeed many of possible remedies have been 
implemented during the crisis: rules on convergence of deposit guarantees, which 
should prevent beggar your neighbour policies; medium-term financial facilities
24;
other IFIs credit lines and investments. Two avenues to improve the EU’s support to 
NMSs deserve discussion: swap lines between the ECB and central banks of non-
Euro Area countries; a broadening of ECB range of accepted collaterals to national 
currency denominated bonds issues by non-euro NMSs countries. These two 
measures, which would have helped to ward off euro liquidity shortages, were 
considered but not implemented at the height of the crisis. They should apply,  if 
conditions require them again, at least to EU members, but the ECB may also 
consider EU candidate and potential candidate countries, with appropriate provisions 
                                                          
24  IMF resources were tripled from USD 250 billion to USD 750 billion, and the EU’s medium-
term financial facility was also upgraded from EUR 12 billion to EUR 50 billion. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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to risk considerations, of course)
25. Finally, although a rise in capital requirements is 
necessary, an immediate implementation of Basel III would be counterproductive at a 
time when economies are still fighting to get out of recession and credit markets are 
functioning very precariously. The phasing-in should rather be gradual.
Crisis resolution 
Since NMSs’ financial markets are dominated by foreign groups, the home-country 
authorities have to work very closely with host-country authorities should a case of 
bank distress appear. It would be important for governors of the central banks 
(representing the main regulatory/supervisory bodies) in the region to stay  in close 
contact and coordinate their measures. To this end, it would be useful to set up a 
Financial Stability Initiative (FSI), which should focus on the systemic problems of the 
non-Eurozone countries and report back to the ESRB and the EFC of the Council. 
Such a body would demand close cooperation among supervisors and central banks 
in the region and it would broaden the concerns which have motivated the 
establishment of the Vienna Initiative. As a matter of fact, the de Larosiere report 
(2009) recommends that special issues and events should prompt the ‘Authorities’ to 
create and lead groups of national supervisors, which should tackle those issues. 
When arguing in favour of creating such groups the de Larosiere report refers, in 
particular, to ‘bankruptcy of a third country systemic group’ (p.54).
Preventing future credit booms 
The most frequently considered instruments are: counter-cyclical capital and reserve 
requirements; dynamic provisioning against expected losses; limits on leverage and 
maturity mismatches; discretionary macro-prudential measures under the guidance of 
newly created marcro-prudential supervision bodies such as the European ESRB.   
The difficulty for the NMSs is that this toolbox mostly applies to countries where credit 
is in the hands of national banks or autonomous local subsidiaries of foreign banks. It 
is not likely to be effective in countries where credit is mostly in the hands of foreign 
bank branches or lending can be outsourced to foreign entities of the banking group 
(i.e. the parent bank or a subsidiary in another country). Coordination among 
supervisors can be a response and should continue being developed but calling for 
coordination is no solution when institutions participating in it have different, possibly 
conflicting mandates and incentives. Structural measures to improve the monitoring of 
financial stability in host countries include: turning foreign bank branches into fully-
fledged subsidiaries; making foreign-owned subsidiaries ‘subject to the same capital 
requirement calculations, and hold that in domestic assets, as the domestic banks’
26;
imposing restrictions on the setting up of new bank subsidiaries in certain areas
27.
                                                          
25  The indication by the ECB in March 2010 that it wishes to review its collateral policy (which was 
arguably prompted by the escalation of the Greek crisis, because under the previously 
announced return to pre-crisis collateral rules Greek government bonds would have not been 
eligible for ECB refinancing) provides an excellent opportunity to consider extending the ECB’s 
regional responsibility to the CESEE region. 
26 Brunnermeier et al., p. 65.
27 ‘The EU home country authorities should limit the acquisition of subsidiaries in other countries, 
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The outsourcing of lending to foreign entities of the banking group does obscure the 
scope of regulatory measures. Therefore, a range of additional means have to be 
considered both at the national and EU level. At the national level: 
x  Tax policy should be actively used (e.g. abolishment of deductibility of interest 
payments in tax declaration and other tax incentives to the housing sector where 
they exist; introduction or increase in property taxes).
x  Measures to encourage domestic saving, such as creating schemes, perhaps with 
tax incentives, to promote long-horizon saving would also improve the 
loan/deposit ratio and thereby limit the potential to unhealthy credit booms and the 
vulnerability of a country in the wake of a crisis. 
At the EU level: 
x  Use the college of supervisors for coming to a common understanding with the 
home country supervisors regarding a proper conduct of foreign banks’ external 
lending operations. 
x  The home- and host-country supervisors should compare the exposure of various 
banking groups towards a host country as it is illustrated by their consolidated 
balance sheets as against those of the subsidiaries in the host country; they 
should also assess the attempts to optimize the use of liquidity on a regional 
basis, which may harm local currencies. 
x  The ESRB and the EFC should address this issue and ask the home country 
supervisor to ‘internalize’ in its policy requirements the host country’s risk 
judgment and worries regarding the expansion of credit and the ‘optimization’ of 
the use of excess liquidity.
Capital controls have resurfaced after the Asian crisis and are increasingly talked 
about nowadays. There are also studies (by the IMF too
28), which show that capital 
controls, if used smartly, can help macroeconomic policy in small open economies, as 
financial markets can be inherently unstable. Thus, contrary to the common 
perception that capital controls can be easily evaded, they do affect the cross-market 
premium in a sustainable way.
29,30  NMSs cannot rely on capital controls as the single 
market prohibits such measures. But  in candidate countries outside the EU capital 
controls could be considered. It may be that renewed capital inflows in and the relative 
ineffectiveness of regulatory measures would force governments to implement 
measures as being applied in other emerging economies, where there is an attempt to 
restrict speculative capital inflows by taxing currency, equity, debt and real estate 
transactions
31. Capital controls that are now being proposed are more in the spirit of 
                                                          
28 Ostry et al.
29 Controls on capital inflows put downward pressure on domestic markets relative to international 
ones, generating a negative premium. The opposite happens with controls on capital outflows. 
This signals the inability of market participants to engage in perfect arbitrage (see Yeyati et al.).
30 Rodrik ’s opinion: ‘Prudential controls on capital flows make a lot of sense. Short-term flows not 
only wreak havoc with domestic macroeconomic management, but they also aggravate adverse 
exchange-rate movements. In particular, ‘hot’ capital inflows make it difficult for financially open 
economies to maintain a competitive currency, depriving them of what is in effect the most 
potent form of industrial policy imaginable’.
31  In Brazil a 2% surcharge was imposed on purchases by foreigners of equity and debt. Russia, 
India, Thailand, have also resorted to such restrictions.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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‘macro-prudential regulation, to be taken in response to capital flows surges that have 
the potential to create bubbles in asset prices, including exchange rates’ 
(Subramanian)
32. For current EU members the risk of destabilizing capital inflows 
leading to credit bubbles has to be addressed through other means, which may 
include action on the demand for credit. Regulatory and tax instruments can, for 
example, be used to tame mortgage credit when deemed excessive from a macro-
prudential point of view.  Finally, the issue of the denomination of lending, i.e. whether 
in domestic or foreign currency, also deserves important considerations.
3.2 STRUCTURE: Taming financial markets is a must 
A return to the initial logic of Bretton Woods is needed in order to preserve an open 
global system. The current crisis has reinforced one of Keynes' intellectual legacies, 
which was enshrined in the Bretton Woods arrangements – namely, that highly volatile 
capital flows are inimical to trade and growth and that financial markets are inherently 
unstable. As a matter of fact restraining financial flows is a way to solve the ‘financial 
policy trilemma” (the impossible trinity); if free trade and relative stability of exchange 
rates are to support durable economic growth capital flows need to be managed.
For decades now a mantra has been heard worldwide: that not much can be done, in 
this regard, because markets would punish a government. But aren't they, aside from 
technological drivers, also the product of human beings' decisions to set rules for 
finance, trade and investment? To claim that nothing can be done about financial 
flows, when they bring about misery, is unconvincing. Whereas cycles in the motion of 
markets are to be expected deep crises can be averted. The bottom line is that well 
functioning markets, which serve most citizens, are not synonymous  with deregulated 
and un-supervised markets!
The financial crisis cannot be explained only by years of cheap money and growing 
imbalances in the world economy. Mistakes in macro-economic policy were 
accompanied by gross abuses of securitisation, abnormally skewed incentives and a 
loss of moral compass, inadequate risk-assessment models and failures to check for 
systemic risks, a breakdown of due diligence and an almost blind belief in the self-
regulating virtues of markets.  Harmonization of rules is not a sufficient response to the 
crisis, since the very content of regulations and supervision needs change. This is what 
comes out prominently from the de Larosiere
33 report and the Turner report (in the UK), 
from documents of the European Parliament
34 and directives of the EC.  A reformed 
regulatory and supervisory framework would observe certain basic principles:
x  all financial entities (including hedge funds and private equity funds35 should be 
regulated and leverage be constrained;
                                                          
32 Subramanian (2009) also notices that, in contrast, the initial Tobin tax and the Turner variant 
would be structural, in the sense that would tax all financial transactions irrespective of the state 
of the macroeconomic cycle.
33 “Report” by The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiere, Brussels, 25 February, 2009. 
34 See also Ieke van den Burg and Daniel Daianu (2008). 
35 Hedge funds and private equity funds contribute to higher systemic risks. The claim that it is 
the money of investors which is at stake is very little of the whole story. High leverage and Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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x  derivative markets should be regulated (products be standardized/simplified and 
clearing houses be used);
x  remuneration be tied to long-term performance and be constrained;  
x  banks be better capitalized (both the amount and quality of capital, primarily of tier 
1) and capital adequacy ratios set in light of systemic risks;
x  pro-cyclicality be avoided in macro-economic policymaking and the way banks 
modify their capital adequacy ratios;
x  banks asked to hold equity shares of securitized loans;  
x  accounting rules should not fuel pro-cyclicality and be standardized globally36; 
x  dealing with the “too big to fail” and “systemically important” entities: the splitting 
of big groups37 and a return to a sort of Glass-Steagall38 legislation are sensible 
options;
x  regulatory arbitrage (including tax havens) be avoided;  
x  use of capital controls for macro-prudential reasons (these are not permitted in the 
EU)
x  limiting volatility in exchange rates and commodity markets (buffer stocks, curbing 
naked short-selling); 
x  the protection of consumers of financial services; 
x  transaction taxes as a means to downsize an over-expanded financial sector, 
diminish negative externalities, and create fiscal revenues39;
x  and, not least, a rethinking of systemic risks40.  
Vested interests have a long arm and try to influence regulations and supervision. 
Already the financial industry is fighting back, by arguing against “regulation overkill”. 
But vested interests must be strongly resisted. In the real world, we need regulators 
                                                                                                                               
focus on short term gains increase overshooting and the speculative nature of such 
operations enhances instability. 
36 There are still major differences between the standards used by EU countries and those used 
by the US. 
37 Market power (concentration) leads to market abuse and, in banking, as this crisis has 
glaringly proved, to heightened systemic risks by the formation of conglomerates that have 
engaged in the manufacturing of synthetic products, used high leverage and very risky 
investment strategies. Ironically,  “the oligopolistic banking system that has emerged from this 
crisis is riskier than the one that went into it” (Wolf, “The Challenges of Managing our Post-
crisis World”, Financial Times, 30 December, 2009, p. 9). Those who claim that size does not 
matter use a self-serving argument. The British authorities have already taken steps in this 
field by asking several banks to divest from some of their business components. 
38 However complicated such an undertaking would be it does make sense. ‘Casino-type” 
banking has to be curtailed as much as possible and “proprietary trading” operations of banks 
be severely restrained.  
39 There are two basic issues here: a) systemic risk, which cannot be divorced from size; and b) 
allocation of resources and distribution of profits.  The intake from such a tax would help the 
IFIs cope with effects of crises in emerging economies, poor economies in general. Proceeds 
from such a tax could also help the EU set up a stabilization funds for dealing with crises. 
40 For an overview of the current thinking on systemic risks see ‘The Concept of Systemic Risk”, 
in Financial Stability Review, European Central Bank, December 2009, pp. 134-142. See also 
“Global Financial Stability Report. Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic 
Risks”, IMF, April 2009, particularly chapter 3 Institute of Economic Forecasting
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and supervisors who have a good understanding of how financial markets function
41.
They should never underestimate systemic risks; they should always be alert to 
financial stability. Strains and crises cannot be entirely avoided – but we can limit the 
damage they cause. Next two issues are looked upon: whether there is danger of 
regulation overkill; and the “too big too fail” problem. 
3.1 The danger of overregulation is overblown 
Over time, as the financial crisis has deepened, it has demolished long-held tenets, 
forcing even zealous advocates of light-touch regulation and self-regulation to admit 
fundamental flaws in such regimes.
42 But despite this seismic change and despite the 
evidence of a financial system in need of thorough reform, a line of reasoning has 
persisted, whose intent appears to be to resist reform and regulation of the financial 
industry. Consider the debate on both sides of the Atlantic about whether and how 
much derivatives – over-the-counter (OTC) products – should be regulated.
The financial industry is fighting back, arguing that such regulations would stifle 
innovation and prompt companies to re-locate where regulation is lighter. But not all 
financial innovation is benign. Likewise, many financial products which were created 
by using mathematical models have proved to be highly unreliable. Nor is the risk of 
re-location convincing. Financial institutions' reputations are tarnished; avoiding 
regulation limits the chances of restoring some of that reputation. And, secondly, 
regulation will follow financial institutions, because most countries increasingly realize 
that reform needs to be coordinated internationally. Principally, though, the industry is 
arguing that more regulation would cut its profits, which might sound a good argument 
at a time of the pressure for recapitalisation. But that argument is short-sighted, self-
serving. It is short-sighted, because what is at stake is the prevention of similarly 
acute crises in the future. It is self-serving, because one industry's profits should not 
be protected at the expense of the rest of the economy. And it is unjustified, because 
over the past two decades the financial industry's profit share of the world's gross 
domestic product (GDP) has increased four or five fold. The argument also avoids the 
moral dimension of the debate on regulation and reform of the industry. How can 
governments sell painful policies that clobber public budgets to citizens while allowing 
those that caused the mess to preserve their old ways of doing business and get big 
bonuses again while their operations are massively subsidized by governments? How 
can they do so when big financial institutions, deemed ‘too big to fail', have been kept 
afloat with public money?
The current crisis is no ordinary recession, and its effects will be long-lasting. In the 
years to come, a phrase frequently used in the poor world – ‘distributional struggle' – 
                                                          
41 Beatrice Weder says that reforms should address the flawed incentives in the regulatory and 
supervision systems, including low pay ( “The dog that did not bark”, The Economist, 3 
October, 2009, p.88). By emphasizing the neglect of systemic risks Gillian Tett talks about a 
“silo curse” (Financial Times, 6 October, 2009). The experience of Spain  and Canada, where 
regulators and supervision have done a much better job than in other advanced economies, is 
quite indicative in this regard. 
42 Alan Greenspan, the long-time head of the US Federal Reserve told the US Congress in 
October 2008, a “risk-management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual 
edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year [2007]”. Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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will probably begin to gain greater traction in advanced economies as well. The past 
couple of decades has revealed a growing income inequality in the US and Europe. 
This income discrepancy will strain public policy and welfare states and cause political 
tensions. At this point, “over-reforming” is, arguably, not the big threat. What would be 
fatal would be failure by policymakers to learn from this huge debacle.
3.2 If banks are too big to fail, then split them up 
The demise of investment bank Lehman Brothers is seen by many analysts as the 
event that brought the confidence crisis in world financial markets to a head. Although 
the financial crisis erupted almost a year earlier, the demise of Lehman Brothers 
seems to have been the tipping point into a worldwide recession. Lehman Brothers did 
not receive government help but many other large financial institutions have. One of 
the key issues in the debate on government bail-outs is whether (and why) the entities 
that are given public money pose any significant systemic risk. When the insurance 
group AIG was bailed out with a staggering amount of US taxpayer's money, the 
argument was clear: the scope and depth of its operations and its links to financial 
clients around the world made rescue a must; non-intervention was judged potentially 
fatal to the financial system as a whole. In a way, the action to rescue AIG replicated, 
on a much grander scale, what the Federal Reserve did in 1998 when it helped, 
indirectly, LTCM, by summoning five investment banks to participate in a joint aid 
initiative.
The phrase ‘too big to fail' has frequently been used in terms of bail-outs. If the size, or 
influence/reach, of financial groups can become an overwhelming problem and policy 
issue, then it has to be dealt with. Anti-trust legislation used to be enacted by 
governments, in the US and in Europe, in order to combat monopolistic behavior that 
undermined competition and extracted undue rents
43.
In finance, waves of deregulation over recent decades increased the scope for the 
formation of very large groups, with operations covering the entire gamut of financial 
services. Globalisation of markets and new information and communication 
technologies (which enhanced global trading in real time) stimulated the emergence of 
genuinely global players – one of which was AIG. Some of these groups have 
cornered the market – as demonstrated by the manifold rise in the share of world 
gross domestic product accounted for by the financial industry's profits in the past 
couple of decades.
But a fundamental challenge is that reckless behaviour by financial giants, 
accompanied by the intense degree of interconnection among them, has epitomised 
systemic risk. Such groups are an obvious flaw in the financial system, to the extent 
that governments are forced to step in when there is need to avoid financial meltdown.
The current efforts to overhaul the regulatory and supervisory systems of financial 
industries in industrial economies should firmly address the size of financial groups. If 
they are too big to be left to die, one has to find an effective response to two 
problems: the moral hazard (not to encourage bad practices by eliminating failure); 
                                                          
43 Both Standard Oil and AT&T were split up in this way. There were also waves of divestments 
in certain industries when it became clear that conglomerates and oversized groups did not 
necessarily bring about better performance. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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and reducing, as much as possible, the burden on the public purse in cases of 
government action. When the size of some players holds the system hostage, it is 
arguably not enough simply to increase transparency, cap leverage, improve capital 
adequacy ratios, avoid pro-cyclical behaviour, impose new remuneration schemes, try 
to regulate conflicts of interest and improve quantitative methods. Splitting large 
financial groups, however, does, arguably, make sense under such circumstances. 
When CEOs of large banking groups argue that not size is the problem – but 
interconnectedness – it sounds very much like a self-serving argument. It would be 
interesting to see one major, global financial institution, which has engaged in 
merchandizing only simple, not toxic, financial products. The big groups have been 
very much behind the financial innovation which has gone astray during the past 
decade. The irony is that the current crisis has induced a spate of takeovers  which 
run counter to this policy. In addition, in Europe the burden-sharing of rescue is more 
than murky while the supervision and regulation of banking sectors is fragmented 
along national lines. This state of affairs may discourage the drive by many banks to 
continue to expand internationally; they may even retreat and become more parochial. 
But overall, this crisis is likely to lead to a consolidation in finance, the perpetuation of 
‘too big to fail' syndrome (be it on a local or national scale), which might recreate the 
systemic risks we are trying to diminish via regulatory and supervision reforms. This 
situation is a further reason to resort to anti-trust law, or very strict regulation of 
finance if banking should be deemed a special industry of a ‘public utility' nature. 
Some might ask if the US and Europe can afford to split up large financial groups at a 
time when Asian financial entities appear to be gaining a competitive edge in the wake 
of the current crisis. This motivation has to be seen in relation to the regulatory 
arbitrage argument. Both these issues need to be taken into account. But it would be 
wrong to jeopardize the functioning of whole economies for corporate benefits which 
are, in the end, uncertain. In addition, why would Asian banks themselves ignore the 
lessons of the current financial crisis, which has worldwide implications? And why 
should the G20 and the Financial Stability Board not help major countries see eye-to-
eye in this regard?
4. Issues to ponder on
Disentangling private from public debt has become a huge, overwhelming issue in the 
EU in view of its deep financial integration. As a matter of fact, the rescue program for 
Greece, which was worked out by EU leaders in the Spring of 2010, was motivated, 
not least, by the big exposure French and German banks have to Greek sovereign 
debt. Private sector debts are making up enormous contingent liabilities on public 
sector debts when bankruptcies are not tolerated. This is one of the big revelations 
entailed by the current crisis. And the inability to disentangle the myriad of intertwined 
debts will impact, negatively, on fiscal policies for years to come. Even now this 
feature of deep financial integration seems to be under-estimated. What is even worse 
is that bank consolidation would increase moral hazard in this industry and would 
preserve the hostage relationship governments budgets are held into.Regaining Financial Stability: Taming Financial Markets
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The current crisis has refocused attention on public budgets owing to big jumps in 
their size registered in countries where large financial entities were threatened by 
collapse and state intervention (rescues) did take place. But the fiscal deficits are no 
less important in economies where the economic downturn has been significant and a 
permanent fall of potential output has been entailed –where the crisis blew up bubbles 
and underlined years of resource misallocation. A country may have, relatively, a low 
public debt, but if a newly revealed structural deficit is pretty high its dent service can 
skyrocket. Unless fiscal consolidation is put into motion a solvency crisis looms at the 
horizon. Related to this issue is the relevance of economic indicators. Fiscal deficit my 
be low for a while, until they explode when “hidden” imbalances come into the open. In 
the EMU current account imbalances among member states were not paid enough 
attention until this crisis hit. Not a few loved to use an analogy with US member states 
–which is quite irrelevant in view of the totally different fiscal arrangements in the EU 
as against the US. And to what extent the intended reform of economic governance in 
the EU would change things dramatically is to be seen. Fiscal rules, surveillance and 
peer pressure may not be enough for strengthening the cohesion of the EMU, of the 
EU in general. An additional handicap in the EU is linked with the political reality that 
tax-payers are, ultimately, national. Can “common goods” (including the euro) be 
protected unless “common resources” are more substantial? Can resolution schemes 
and orderly restructuring schemes of sovereign debts be devised so that they 
compensate the smallness of the EU budget and complexity of the EU decision 
making process?
Would a deflationary bias in the conduct of monetary policy appear in view of the 
willingness to prick bubbles in their infancy? On the other hand,  would’ n’ it, by 
fostering less instability, support long-term growth? This is also an issue which 
demands more thorough answers. In a way, answering this question is analogous to 
deciding on a proper speed of implementing Basel III: for a too fast implementation 
could stifle recovery; on the other hand, a too slow implementation would create 
prerequisites for a new crisis. 
Debt deflation is a policy risk. If this would occur in several major economies a relapse 
into a financial crisis could ensue, with staggering effects. A “japanization” of these 
economies , namely a long period of stagnation induced by liquidity trap and low 
consumption, would take place. Financial stability would be once more at the top of 
public agenda in view of the steadily worsening bank balance-sheets. Public debts 
may be burdened again provided an exit via deliberate creation of inflation is 
considered not an option.
Does size matter for judging fiscal risk? It appears that it does. Large economies are, 
seemingly, considered to have a bigger capacity to resists shocks; they are, 
potentially, more resilient. Resilience (ability to withstand external and internal shocks) 
will increasingly be a principal policy aim.
When it comes to judging structure globally the emergence of new economic powers 
and the dynamic of competition, via non-zero sum games, get to the forefront. 
Because unwinding global imbalances, when zero-sum games are frequent, is quite 
painful. This has to be seen in conjunction with a shifting geopolitical reality. The latter 
is visibile also in the functioning of the G 20, in the functioning of the IFIs. Bank Institute of Economic Forecasting
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competition should be seen through geopolitical lenses too. And if this is so prospects 
for a reform of regulation and supervision would be influenced. 
What would be the impact of new technology for circumventing rules (ex: high-
frequency trading)? Regulators and supervisors need to take it into account as well, 
when thinking about financial stability. The latter can be linked also with the capacity 
of economy to withstand effects of natural disasters, with social strain. Demographics, 
too, plays in a role when it perturbs inter-generational balance and, consequently, 
fiscal equilibrium.
Overall, the years to come will quite likely be accompanied by an increasingly 
uncertain environment; complexity will also be on the rise. These circumstances would 
advocate for a more simple financial intermediation system, for banking getting back 
to its roots. If this will not happen, more fragmentation is to be expected, with societies 
turning, probably, more inward-looking. This will have profound implications for the 
global system. It may be that, by taking into account the lessons of financial crises and 
the need to lend to economies more resilience, that there is an optimal size of 
openness (trade and finance-wise). This implies that firms need to think globally and 
operate selectively (be close to home) as a means for mitigating risks. It may also be 
the case that, over the longer run, we will end up with a three blocs-based world 
financial system as a means to maintain a relatively open global system. 
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